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IN THE

Supreine Court
OF THE

State of Utah

CLAREXCE B. LAMBERT,

Respondent,
-vs.JERRY SINE and DORA SINE, doing business under the name and
style of Se Rancho Motor Lodge
and Tourist Apartments,

No. 7572

Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

ST.A.TE~fENT

OF FACTS

This action was commenced by the respondent for an
unlawful eviction and conversion of personal property.
The action was not based upon the forceful entry and
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detainer statute, nor did it seek recovery of possession,
but rather was an action for damages only. (Tr. 1, 2).
The controversy arose out of the following circumstances:
On January 2, 1950, the respondent, his brother
Charles, and Dan Moore negotiated with Mrs. Sine, one
of the appellants and joint owner of Se Rancho Motor
Lodge in Salt Lake City for the hire of one of the motel
units. (Tr. 15, 38, 51). After some discussion of the
terms and the nature of the units available, it was <lecided that unit No. 107 (Tr. 16, 39, 51) would be occupied by the boys at the rate of $21.00 per week in advance,
(Tr. 48, 49, 60) payable bi-weekly,. which pay period
corresponded closely to the pay period of one of the boys.
(Tr. 45, 49). The three boys signed the "Guest Registration'' card, (Exhibit 1) and moved into the unit. (Tr.
30).
Unit No. 107 consisted of three furnished rooms and
a hath. (Tr.18). r:ewo rooms were bedrooms with double
beds and the third roon1 was a small kitchen or kitchenette. (Tr. 18). Linens, heat, light, water, and telephone
service were furnished to the occupants, ('Tr. 21, 22, 86),
and some housecleaning service was performed, ( Tr. 103,
104) as well as maintenance service. (Tr. 24, 25, 70-72).
Garbage service and facilities were available to the occupants. ( Tr. 2i3, 87). The boys furnished their own
cooking utensils and dishes, etc. (Tr. 33).
Under this arrangement the three boys 1ived at the
motel until the ea:dy part of l\f areh 1950, at which time
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two of the boys n1oved out, (Tr. 25) leaving· the plaintiff
alone living in the unit. On or about -March 13th, the
boys were in arrears on their payments for two weeks
and owed $10.93 for telephone calls. The telephone service had been discontinued in early February for the failure to pay the bill for the same. (Tr. 33).
Prior to :March 15th one or more discussions were
had between the respondent and ~Irs. Sine regarding the
delinquent payn1ents. ( Tr. 62, 105). In each case the
respondent pron1ised to make a payment within a short
period, but failed to do so. On ~Iarch 15th the locks on
the doors were changed. (Tr. 54). \Yhen the plaintiff
returned he could not get into his apartment and inquired
at the office. (Tr. 54, 107). He was inforrned that he
was locked out for non-payment of his bill. Seventy-three
dollars was claimed to be due, including the week commencing on :March 13th and the telephone bill. The respondent claimed the bill was excessive and left the motel.
(Tr. 54, 55). The next morning he was permitted to secure his work clothes from the unit. (Tr. 57, 89, 108). On
:\Iarch 17th the respondent claims to have tendered an
amount between $50 and $60 as payment in full. (Tr.
58).
The tenant~' was never resumed and at a later time
all but a fe\v of the better items of clothing were released to the respondent, the balance being retained as
sreu rity for a lien for the payments due. ( Tr. 108, 109).
rrhe respondent brought this action to recover $1,000
damages for wrongful dispossession, for $200 for con-
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version of personal property, and for $1,000 punitive
damages. (Tr. 1, 2). 'The appellants counterclaimed for
the unpaid rent and telephone bill. (Tr. 3). The court
found for the respondent on the wrongful dispossession
and allowed $250.00 damages for mental anguish and
suffering; no amount was awarded as actual damages.
(Tr. 8). The court found that the appellants had not
acted maliciously and granted the counterclaim in the
sum of $64.96. (Tr. 8, 9). It was further held that the
appellants properly had a lien on the personal property
for the upaid charges. (Tr.126).
STA 'TE~fEXT OF POINTS

I.
THE RELATION OF THE APPELLANTS TO THERESPONDENT WAS THAT OF INNKEEPER AND GUEST.

II.
IT WAS ERROR TO AWARD DAMAGES FOR MENTAL
ANGUISH AND HUMILIATION WHERE THERE WAS NO
WILLFUL OR MALICIOUS WRONG AND NO AWARD OF
ACTUAL DAMAGES.

III.
THE APPELLANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AT THE
CLOSE OF THE PLAINTIFF'S CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN
GRANTED.

IV.
THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES AWARDED WAS EXCESSIVE.
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ARGt:~fEXT

I.
THE RELATION OF THE APPELLANTS TO THE RESPONDENT WAS THAT OF INNKEEPER AND GUEST.

If the dispossession be wrongful it must he on the
basis that the relation between the parties was that of
landlord and tenant, rather than innkeeper and guest. If
the relation was that of landlord and tenant, the appellants should have resorted to the statutory remedy of
unla-wful detainer. Buchanan v. Crites, 106 Utah 428,
150 P. 2d 100, 15-1 A.L.R. 167; Paxton v Fisher, 86 Utah
408, -15 P. 2d 903. If the relation was that of innkeeper
and guest, no notice need be given. Roberts v. Casey 36
Cal. App. 2d Supp. 767, 93 P. 2d 654; De War v. Minnesota Lodge N" o. 4-1, B.P.O.E., 155 ~finn. 98, 192 N.W. 358,
32 A.L.R. 1012. Nor can the guest maintain an action for
ejectment or trespass. 3 Thompson on Real Property,
Perm. Ed., Sec. 1076.
The principal distinction between the landlord and
tenant relationship and that of innkeeper and guest is
that the tenant acquires an interest in the real estate and
has the exclusive possession of the leased premises, while
the lodger acquires no estah~ and has merely the use wit~
out the actual or exclusive possession. Coggins v.
Gregorio (10 Cir.), 97 F. 2d 948, 950. The distinction is
stated in 3 Thompson on Real Property, Perm., Ed., Sec.
1076, as follows:
''The chief distinction betwPen a tenant anrl
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lodger rests in the character of possession; the
'tenant' having exclusive legal possessron of the
premises and being responsible for the care and
condition thereof, and the 'lodger' having merely
the right to the use of the premises; the landlord
retaining control and the right of access to the
premises.''
The controlling factor 1n determining the relation is
the intention of the parties derived from the contract and
the circumstances surrounding the transaction. The
character of the relation being a mixed question of law
and fact. Roberts v. Casey, supra; 3 Thompson on Real
Property, Perm. Ed., Sec. 1076.
The circumstances to be considered in determining
the relation are discussed in Roberts v. Casey, supra, as
follows:
''In the instant case the circumstances already alluded to, that the plaintiffs at all times retained keys to all of the apartments and had
regular access to them for caretaking purposes,
furnished the linen and caused it to be laundered,
furnished regular maid service and caused the
beds to be changed and in some of the apartment~,
though perha;ps not in those of appellants, to be
made every day as well, kept not only the hallways but also the carpets and windows in the
apartment:-: themselves clean, and attended to the
removal of garbage, as well as furnishing light,
water, heat and telephone service, are matters
tending as far as they go to show the relation of
the partie:; to h[lxe been that of proprietors and
lodgers rather than landlords and tenants. Fox
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v. 'Yinden1ere Hotel A pt. Co .• 30 Cal. A pp. 162,
164. 165, 157 P. 820.
"On the other hand, it is true, as we also ~a w
that there were. on the pren1ises, no con1mon
kitchens, dining rooms. toilets or bathrooms; that
the suites had severally these various facilities;
that each suite was, in some sort, a distinct unit,
and that the rent for a suite was the same without
regard to the number of occupants. These circumstances tended, so far as they went, to characterize the relations between respondents and appellants as those of landlords and tenants. Fox v.
'Yinden1ere Hotel Apt. Co., 30 Cal. App. 162, 164,
-- p • ~:....~
- , 1 ') . ( page 6""8)
t:>
• ''
1<)I
After considering the factors just discussed, the California court held that the relation was that of proprietor
and lodger. In this case the proprietor had removed,
without notice, the doors from the lodger's apartment.
The controlling circumstances in the present case are
as follows:
1.

THE COXTRACT.

In this case, the contract, Exhibit 1, is entitled,
''Guest Registration.'' One of the occupants testified that
at the time of signing the guest registration card he
understood what was meant by the word ''guest.'' His
testimony is as follows :
'' Q. Do you know the difference between a
'guest' and a 'tenant'~
''A.

Yes.
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'' Q. What is the difference~
''A. Well, a guest is just there for a short
time, and a tenant is there permanently.

"Q. Were you aware of that at the time you
engaged this unit~
"A.

Yes." (Tr. 31).

2. REPAIRS AND MAINTENANCE.
H. Sharon Woodcock testified that he was the maintenance man for the appellants and that during the respondent's occupancy he had to adjust the heating
mechanism and repaired a chair used in the unit. (Tr.
24, 25, 70-72). In :Marden v. Radford, 229 :Mo. App. 789,
84 S.W. 2d 947 the court stated:
''That the defendant considered himself
obliged, under plaintiff's occupancy, to keep the
apartment in a reasonable state of repair for
plaintiff's habitation and to make repair of furniture and fixtures therein necessarily negatives the
idea of the relationship of landlord and tenant.
No such obligation is imposed under such relationship in the absence of a contract so to do." (page
958).
See also 3 Thompson on Real Property, Perm. Ed.
Sec. 1561.
3.

l\fAID SERYI CE.

No maid service in the usual meaning was rendered;
however, :Mrs. Sine testified she scrubbed the floor on
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one occasion (Tr. 103) and sent the 111aid in a eouple of
times to straighten things up and once to do house cleaning such as washing down the whole bathroom and
kitchen walls ete. (Tr. 104). All of this is definitely inconsistent with a landlord and tenant relation.
4.

Fl-;-RXITrHE

A~D

FlXTFRES.

All of the furniture was supplied by the appellants
as well as clean linens. A mop, mop pail and broom were
likewise furnished by the appellants. (Tr. 18, 22, 44,
80, 81, 82).

5. UTILITI E;-o;.
There is no dispute but what the appellants furnished the heat, light, water, and telephone service and
that, when the telephone bill had not been paid they withdrew this service from the respondent. (Tr. 21, 86, 87).
Concerning these factors, the case of :Marden v. Radford,
supra, states as follows:
''Likewise, the evidence tending to show the
control retained by defendant over the electricity,
gas, water, light, heat, and telephone service
through his complete control of the means by .
which such were communicated to and furnished
plaintiff in her apartment and by which he could
deprive plaintiff and her apartment of such without consulting her or without her consent might
give grounds for an inference that defendant had
not parted with the entire possession and control
of such apartment to the plaintiff, but that, upon
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the other hand, he had retained a measure of control thereof through such instrumentalities and
was actually asserting such control.'' (page
957).
6.

GARBAGE DISPOSAL.

The occupants testified that for the first week the
garbage was picked up by a motel employee, and the
remainder of the time the boys put their garbage in
receptacles supplied by the motel. (Tr. 23). The motel
had the garbage disposed of by a private carrier. (Tr.
B7).

7.

PASS KEYS.

Both Mr. Woodcock (Tr. 72) and Mrs. Sine (Tr.
103) testified that they had pass keys to the unit and
used them. One of the boys testified that he supposed
the appellants had pass keys to the unit. (Tr. 24).

8.

KITCHEN FACILITIES.

The presence of kitchen facilities does not negative
or prevent the existence of an innkeeper and guest relationship. :Marden v. Radford, supra, Vaughn v. Neal
(D.C.), ·60 Atl. 2d :2:14.
9.

FREQUEKCY OF PAY:.\fENTS.

The length of time and the periods of payments are
not controlling factors in determining the relation. In
Fisher v. Bonneville Hotel Co., 55 Utah 588, 188 P. 856,
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12 ~-\..L.R. 2:)3, th~ Utah Supren1e Court ~taterl as follow~:
"If a person goes into an inn as a wayfarPr
and a traveler. and the innkee·per receives hin1 as
such, he becmnes the innkeeper's guest, and the rPlation of landlord and guest is instantly established betw~en then1. K either the length of time
that a man remains at an inn nor any agreement
that he may make as to the price of board per day,
depriYe~ him of his character as a traveler and
a guest. provided he retains his status of traveler
in other respects.''

-

In this ca~e. a Ftah legislator registered at the Newhouse
Hotel and secured a monthly rate for the period while
he was attending the legislature. See, also, the annotation following the case appearing at 12 A.L.R. 261, Relationship of Innkeeper and Guest as Affected by Payment of Accommodations by Week, Month, or the Like.
· Generally speaking, a weekly payment is an incident of
a guest relationship.

10. PERIOD OF OCCePAXCY.
The period of occupancy also does not negative the
relationship of an innkeeper and guest. In Marden v.
Radford, supra, it is stated:
·'Neither does the fact that the plaintiff may
have been occupying the apartment in question
under conditions of pern1anancy as a homP for the
timP being preclude her from being a lodger.''
(page 0;)7).
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11.

NATURE OF S:TAY.

An important factor is whether the occupants are
establishing a home or a transient residence or stopping
place. The arrangement made here was temporary as to
each of the boys and was in no sense a home or permanent residence. Clarence Lambert lived at his mother's
home before and after his sojourn at theSe Rancho. (Tr.
50, 58, 59). He testified that about the time he was locked
out, he was planning, anyway, to seek "other lodging."
(Tr. ;>2).
Charles Lambert likewise lived at the family home
before and after living at the Se Rancho. (Tr. 13, 1-l:,
25, 26, 28). He had been married and a divorce action
was pending during this interlude. (Tr. 27).
The mother of the Lambert boys had given up her
home and was living with her husband in \Vendover
during the tin1e the boys were living at the Se Rancho.
( Tr. 25, 26, 27). Charles left the motor court voluntarily
when his mother resumed housekeeping again at their
nome in Salt Lake City. (Tr. 27).
The boys were both young. ( ~r rs. Sine refers to
them as "boys." ( Tr. 100, 101, 102). Their mother called
them when she ""'as in town and Charles was drawing
unemployment pa~· temporarily. (Tr. 22).
Don 1\foore had been living in \Yendover but a divorce action was pending while he lived at the Se Rancho.
(Tr. 42, 43). He had been a roomer in his brother's house
before he rnoved in with these boys ( Tr. 38, 43, 44), and
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upon leaving the motor court voluntarily on :\larch l~t,
he moved home with his mother. ·(Tr. -1-1).
Thus, it appears that all of the hoy~ were seeking
temporary residence and not a hon1e and that they were
transients, lodgers, or roomers. As to the significance
of this factor see: -13 C.J.S. 1138, Innkeepers, Sec. 3; 32
C.J. 538, Innkeepers, Sec. 18, 28 Am. Jur. 553, Innkeepers, Sec. 2:1.
In determining the legal status of the parties in
their relations with each other, it is recognized that the
resnlt cannot be said to depend on any one factor as being
decisive. It is, rather, a question of which direction the
general effect of the various tests which have been applied, after weighing opposing ones against each other,
can be said to take. It is not a question of what the relation would be if considered in some isolated aspect, but
rather, what is its dominant character. This determination, as it has been pointed out, is a mixed question of law
and fact. In this case there is little dispute as to the
factual issues, and after looking at all of the various
factors, it is clear that the dominant character of the relation was that of an innkeeper and guest.
In a recent California case, N oblit v. Blickshire
Hotels and l\fotels, 93 Cal. App. 2d 864, 210 P. 2d 43, the
plaintiffs occupied a motel cottage, No. F -9, consisting
of three furnished rooms, and ren1ained there for approximately three years. The charge for the occupancy
was at the rate of $19.50 per week. The plaintiffs left
the auto court on a vacation, without paying the rent for
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the use and occupancy of the cottage. While they were
away, the defendants broke the lock and entered the
premises and removed and stored the plaintiff's prop'"
erty. The plaintiffs brought an action to recover
damages for conversion and forceful entry. Judgment
was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs in the sum of
$753.49, and the defendants appealed. After outlining
the above facts, the remainder of the court's opinion
is as follows:
''This is the sole question necessary for us
to determine :
"Do the foregoing findings disclose any
actionable wrong committed by defendants?
''This question must be answered in the nega.
tive. The trial court expresRly found that in removing the lock from the rooms occupied by plaintiffs and storing their personal property in a
storeroom such actions 'were with cause and for
the reason that plaintiffs had refused and continued to refuse to pay the lawful charge for the
occupancy of said cottage' and that the acti'Ons
of defendants were not willful or malicious.

I~r

w

~~

, ~1

:1r

''Clearly if the actions of defendants were
with cause and neither willful nor malicious plaintiffs have failed to establish a cause of action. A
judgment should have been ordered for defendants.
''The judgment is reversed with directions to
the trial court to enter judgment in favor of defendants.''
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In Roberts v. Casey, supra, the owner of the Riviera
Apartment Hotel removed the door to the apartment and
all moveable furniture and bedding, for the reason that
the occupants were in arrears on their rent. The occupants, however, did not vacate the premises and a forceful detainer action was commenced. In this case the
owner of the apartment hotel retained keys to all of the
apartments, furnished linen and maid service, washed
the windows, attended to the removal of garbage, and
furnished light, water, heat, and telephone service. The
apartments rented were individual units, having kitchens,
dining rooms. hathrooms, and other facilities making the
apartment a distinct unit, and was rented as a suite.,
without regard to the numher of occupants. Under these
circumstances, the court held that the relation was one
of proprietors and lodgers, rather than landlord and
tenants. The court further stated:
'' \\' e conclude, therefore, that so soon as a
guest or lodger has either by default in making
payments due or otherwise, breached his contract
he may by appropriate proceedings be ousted
without the requirement of any advance notice.
His actual right to remain having ceased, his
continued presence amounts to little more than a
trespass and, as said in Gladwin v. Stebbins, 2 Cal.
103, 105, 'it would be absurb, in such a case, to
require either a denmnd, or notice to quit.' ''
A~ was recognized in Buchanan v. Crites, supra, at
eomnwn law the landlord had the right to dispossess a
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tenant by force. In that case the court recognized that
there was split of authority as to whether the Forceful
Entry and Detainer statutes did away with this commonlaw right. The court then concluded that the commonlaw right was abolished in Utah by virtue of the statute.
Some courts, without abolishing the right altogether, still
permit peaceful dispossession but do not permit the use
of force, which might tend to create a breach of the peace.
Burford v. Crause (D.C. 1950), 89 Fed. Supp. 818.
If it is concluded that a motel operator tmder these
circumstances is a landlord, he cannot even peacefully
retake possess~on, nor does he have an innkeeper's lien
as created by 52-3-1, 1943 Utah Code Annotated; he is,
in fact, in the position of being virtually without a
remedy. An occupant can then rent by the week for an
indefinite period and agree to pay in advance. If, howev'er, he fails to pay in advance, the motel operator must
then serve notice to vacate and bring an unlawful detainer action. If, in the meantime, the occupant desires to
remove his few personal belongings and leave, there
is nothing the motel operator can do. The lessor's lien,
as granted in 52-3-1, only applies to unexempt personal
property, which would not likely be in the possession of
a motel occupant. 'rhe innkeeper's lien, 52-2-2, 1943 Utah
Code Annotated, applies to all personal property, but
this lien is not aYailable to the motel operator once it is
determined that the relation is one of landlord and tenant. Fudge v. Downing, 83 Utah 101, 27 P. 2d 33.
In the case now under consideration, the respondent
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owed two weeks' and two days' rent and a telephone
bill (Tr. 64), two of his friends had already morved out
('Tr. 52), and he had told the appellants he intended to
move out in about a week. (Tr. 52). Respondent repeatedly pronused to pay the rent and had failed to do
so. ·(Tr. 105, 106). Yet, under the holding of the trial
court that the relation was that of landlord and tenant,
the appellants would be without a practical remedy. The
precarious situation of the motel operator must have
been realized by the trial judge who, although he would
not recognize the right of the appellants to peacefully
dispossess the respondent, did give to the appellants
the benefit of the innkeeper's lien. The court by so doing
inconsistently held in one instance that the relation was
that of landlord and tenant, and in the other, that the
relation was that of innkeeper and lodger.
Another fact is persuasive. Utah statutes provide
for terminating landlord-tenant relationships only under
Chapter 60, Title 104, of the Code. Assume a weekly
occupancy by a person not desirable. If the undesirable
pays the fees required, the landlord could not evict him
without a full fifteen days' notice prior to the end of the
term, under 104-60-3(2), U. C. A., 1943, which is Inore
than two full terms. This statute as a practical matte-r
requires that a weekly rental period be not considPred a
landlord-tenant relationship.
All of the factors considered and the general policy
involved in this case are more consistent with the holding
of the court that the relation was that of innkeeper and
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guest, and for this reas·on the other holding, that the relation was that of landlord and tenant, should be set
aside.

II.
IT WAS ERROR TO AWARD DAMAGES FOR MENTAL
ANGUISH AND HUMILIATION WHERE THERE WAS NO
WILLFUL OR MALICIOUS WRONG AND NO AWARD OF
ACTUAL DAMAGES.

The -court's eighth and tenth findings of faet are as
follows:
'' 8. The court further finds that the unlawful actions of the defendants caused the plaintiff great mental anguish and suffering and that
he was greatly embarrassed and humiliated, to
his damage in the sum of $250.00.''
"10. The court finds that the defendants'
acts were not malicious.''
Assuming for the purpose of this discussion that
the relation between parties was that of landlord and
tenant and that the appellants wrongfully locked the
respondent out of his motel unit, the judgment still can
not be supporte<l. It is a general rule that mental pain
and suffering do not alone constitute a suffi-cient basis
for recovery of suhstantial dmnages. Certain exceptions
to this rule are recognized, such as a breach of contract
to marry, certain wilful wrongs, especially those affpeting the liberty of personal security, and those eases
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affecting character reputation or domestic relations. 25
C. J. S. 551, Damages, Se.c. 64.
In this case no dan1age was awarded the respondent,
other than the an1ount granted by finding of fact number
eight. Xo case has been located where an award of this
nature has been allowed, except where it is an incident
of some actual damage, usually arising out of a violation
of a personal right rather than an injury to a property
right. In fact, the general rule, as stated in Corpus Juris
Secondlun and . American Jurisprudence, is as follows:
·'In the absence of fraud, malice, or the like,
mental anguish suffered in connection with an injury to property is not an element of damage."
25 C.J .S. 555, Dan})ages, Sec. 68.
"Ordinary injury to the feelings is not a
proper element of damages in action for injury to
property, for its unlawful seizure or detention,
or for trespass committed thereon. The contrary
is true, however where the injury is inflicted willfully or maliciously or with circumstances of aggravation or a manifest disregard of the injured
party's rights, provided, of course, the ordinary
and natural consequences of the act complained
of would be to cause an injury to the feeling * * *
Son1e courts hold that the doctrine of mental
anguish is never applicable in such cases, hut that
if the act is accomplj~·dJPd hy circumstances of aggravation, the plaintiff's remedy is by the recovery of exemplar~, damages." 15 Am. Jur. 598,
/Jruna,r;es, See. 181.
~o

Utah

ea~e

has been found contrary to the above
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general rules, although there are two Utah cases which
allow, as an incident to a wrongful eviction, damages for
mental suffering where the eviction was wrongful and
malicious and wheer other circumstances of aggravation
were present. In one case the court stated that the award
could he supported on the alternative theory of exemplary damages.
In Burford v. Crause (March 1950), 89 F. Sup. 818,
the landlord, after the expiration of the tenant's term,
finally broke the lock on the premises and removed and
stored the tenant's possessions. The action by the tenant
was not for possession but for wrongful eviction causing
damages to his credit reputation, humiliation among his
business associa tPs, and loss of income. The court held:
''Taking these matters in their inverse order,
the court finds as a fact that there was no showing
of any da1i1ages. The plaintiff was unable to point
to a single loss of a customer or credit standing,
and testified merely to the fact that he was personally embarrassed under the mistaken apprehension that others might think he was being unlawfully evicted for failure to pay rent. Such
proof does not amount to a showing of legal
damages compensible under the law, nor is he
entitled to punitive da1nages." (p. 819).
In Cochrane v. Tuttle, 75 Ill. 361, the plaintiff moved
into the defendant's house and occupied part of the
rooms, cared for the defendant and his family, and took
in other boarders. The defendant terminated the re-
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lationship, locked the plaintiff out, and offered to return
all personal belongings to the plaintiff. At the trial a
verdict in the sum of $1,250 was returned for the plaintiff. On appeal the court held that it was doubtful if
there was a landlord and tenant relation but, even so,
the damages Rwarded were excessive, and stated as
follows:
· · "\Ye do not see how the judgment can be pernlitted to stand. The amount found by the jury
i~ out of all proportion to any injury inflicted,
even upon the theory of plaintiff, the relation of
landlord and tenant existed, and that she was
evicted by the defendant. No force was used. She
suffered no personal injury, and it is proven she
recovered eYery article of personal property she
left in the house. There being no evidence of any
actual damages, it follows the amount found consisted wholly of punitive or exemplary damages.
The testimony in the case shows no such willful
disregard of the rights of plaintiff as would
authorize the imposition of any considerable exelnplary damages."
In Toler v. Cassinelli, 129 \Y. Ya. 591, 41 S.E. 2d
672, the defendant locked the plaintiff out of the apartment for failure to pa:v rent. Two special interrogatories
were submitted to the jury. The first, ''How nmch do
you find, if any, as compensatory damages?'' The second,
''How much do you find, if any, as exen1plary damages J? ' '
The jtu~· did not answer the first question and answered
tlw second question by stating the sum of $1,000. A
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general verdict was prepared on this special finding and
signed by the jury foreman. On appeal it was held that
there could not be an award for punitive damages without an award for compensatory damages. The court
recognized the general rule that if there was no willful
eviction the court c;ould not allow damages for mental
pain and suffering.
In Michels v. Boruta (Texas), 122 S.W. 2d 216, one
of the plaintiffs and her former husband recovered a
judgment of $12.50 each for damages to a tombstone on
their son's grave, and the wife recovered $800 exemplan·
damages for mental pain and suffering. The wife had
not claimed in her complaint any damage arising from
injury to the tombstone, but, rather, only asked for
damages for the mental pain and suffering arising from
the desecration of her child's grave. The jury found that
the defendant had not acted willfully, but rather, his
conduct only amounted to negligence. On appeal concerning the awarding of damages, the appellate court stated:
''As to the question of the right of the appellees to recover as a part of actual damages resulting from trespass or negligence damages for
injury to feelings-mental pain and anguish-in
the absence of any other actual dan1ages, :-;erms
to have been settled by decjsion of the supreme
court in Gnlf C. & S. F. Hy. Co. v. Trott, 86 rrex.,
412, 25 S.\V. 419, 40 A1n. St. R. 866, that there
exists no such right of recovery.'' 13 Tex. J ur. 211,
Sec. 119.
"It 1nay be regarded as a stated proposition
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of law that in the absence of actual damages there
can be no recovery for exemplary damages.''
In the present case the only injury suffered by the
respondent, assun1ing that he was in fact a tenant, was
the violation of his possessory right to quiet enjoyment
of his motel unit. Since the court expressly found that
the appellants had not acted maliciously, and since this
wrong is one to a property right and no other actual
damage was found, it was erroneous for the trial court to
award $250 for mental pain and suffering and
humiliation.
III.
THE APPELLANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AT THE
CWSE OF THE PLAINTIFF'S CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN
GRANTED.

At the close of the plaintiff's case the folowing motion was made :
''Defendants move that the complaint be dismissed, no cause of action, for the reason that
there is no showing that the relationship between
the plaintiff and the defendants was other than
innkeeper or motel keeper and guest, and for the
reason that no damage has been shown and that
the arnount of rent-and it affirmatively appears
that there is rent owing, and that the clothing is
held only as a security for the rent.
"THE COURT: The motion will be denied,
and you may procePd with presenting your evi-
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dence. We can discuss it at some later time. We
can discuss in some detail just what this situation
is. I can either show, as I have shown, it is denied,
or defer a ruling on it. I'm going into the law
oorefully after we hear evidence in the case.'' ( Tr.
69).
The first part of the motion with regard to the relation
of the parties hereto has been discussed under point I
of this argument. The other part of the motion was based
on the lack of evidence as to damages. The only evidence
up to this point on the issue of damages was the respondent's testimony, which was as follows:

'' Q.

I said, where did you spend Friday

night~

"A.

At n1y mothers.

'' Q.

And what were the conditions there 1

''A. Y ery crowded; my brother-my mother
has two small rooms and very crowded and my
mother and brother were already there. I had to
sleep on a carpet." (Tr. 58).
It is submitted that this evidence, without nwre, is insufficient to warrant an award of damages, as is discussed in Point II, in that the only damage shown would
be that of inconYenience of sleeping on the floor and
no showing of actual damage. The fact that this evidence
was not sufficient to base an award for damages is shown
quite conclusively by the action of the court at the close
of the entire case. After both parties had rested and
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had argued the case, the court concluded to find for the
respondent and recalled the reporter (Tr. 117) and on its
own motion {Tr. 124) reopened the case to ascertain the
amount of damages suffered.
IV.
THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES AWARDED WAS EXCESSIVE.

Assuming for the sake of this argument that the
first three propositions are found against the appellants,
the amount of damages awarded is excessive. The
seventh and eighth findings of fact are as follows:
'"7. The court finds that the unlawful actions of the defendant caused the plaintiff to seek
lodgings elsewhere and that on the 16th day of
~larch, 1950, the plaintiff :stayed at his mother's
home and, owing to the crowded conditions there,
he slept on the floor.

"8. The court further finds that the unlawful a;ctions of the defendants caused the plaintiff
great mental anguish and suffering and that he
was greatly embarrassed and humiliated, to his
dan1age in the sun1 of $230.00."
The respondent's testimony as to his having to sleep on
the floor has been set out under Point III; just discussed.
After the case was reopened by the court on its own
motion and the attorney for the respondent had questioned him concerning the value of the clothing retained,
the following testimony was given concerning the dam-
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ages awarded under the finding of fact number eight.
"MR. FRANK.

Is that all, your

Honor~

"THE COURT. Well, I think perhaps if you
are interested in this other matter of damages
that you should ask him about it.
''MR. BIRD: I object to reopening for that,
without any showing of plaintiff, but upon the
court's suggestion; no part of the plaintiff's case.
''THE COURT:

Objection overruled.

"Q. Mr. Lambert, when you approached
Mrs. Sine to allow you to get your work clothes,
can you describe your feelings on that morning?
''A. It was embarrassing for me to go seek
lodging in the clothing I was wearing.
''MR. BIRD : Move that that be stricken as
a conclusion, state of mind, and not competent
evidence.
"THE COURT:

:Motion denied.

"A. \Vhat other-now, what other feelings
did you have~
"THE COURT:

Let's ask him now-

,' )JR. FRANK:

What 1

''THE COURT: He said, 'Clothing I was
wearing'; I have never heard what dothing he
was wearing.
''A.

A pair of Levi's and aT shirt.

''THE COURT:
'' :\f H. FRANK:

Thank you now, go ahead.
I am confused myself.
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'· Q. This was-you said you were embarrassed when you went where in these'' ~-\. \Yhen I went to the hotel to seek lodging, and, also, when I had to go back and ask Mrs.
Sine for n1y clothing, I feltre~t

••Q. \Yere you uncomfortable without the
of your clothes-

'' ~rR. BIRD : Objected to as leading and
suggestive.
"THE COURT:

Objection overruled.

· · ~rR. BIRD: Calling for a conclusion.
"Q. -that

night~

'·A. I felt rather friend asked me-

well, when my girl

''THE COURT: Now, just a minute, you
better answer the questions; don't tell us what
your girl friend asked you. He said-

•'Q.

Can you describe-

" THE COURT: -during this time when
you were wearing this T shirt and Levi's that
night, were you''A.

Yes, sir.

'' Q. The next n1orning, now, when you went
back to get your clothes, your work clothes fro1n
:\Irs. Sine, how did you feel on that morning~

'' ~\IR. BIRD: Object to that as incompetent,
irrelevant, and imrnaterial.
•' THE COURT: How he felt may be imnlaterial. With respect to this request that you
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made of Mrs. Sine, what if any reaction did you
have from that~
''A. Mrs. Sine asked me if I needed them.
I told her I needed the clothes and I felt very
humiliated to think I had to go back and ask her
for them. She made me feel rather embarrassed,
the way she puts things.

'' Q. And, that night, when you went home,
back to your mother's house, did you have those
same feelings at that time~
''A.

I did, sir.

'' Q. And you-were you uncomfortable that
night~

''A.

I was very uncontfortable.

"Q.

That is the night you slept on the floor?

''A.

Yes, sir.

'' Q. And you-what were your feelings m
connection with that~
''A. ~1y mother had friends at the house,
and, to explain rny be,ing there the way I was, was
very uncmnfortable.
'' ~1R. FRANK: Is that sufficient, your
Honor ?" ( Tr. 121, 122, 123).
0

In the above testimony the respondent indicated that
he suffered son1e embarrassment because of the clothing
he was wearing. rrhe respondent testified that he went
to his apartment on the 15th after getting off from work
and reruained there approximately 15 minutes (Tr. 53)
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and then went to hi~ mother's plare in Salt Lake City,
and after approximately 2% hours returned to his motel
unit and was unable to get in (Tr. 54). On Tr. 57, line
6, he testified that he picked up his work clothes next
morning and had, in addition, the clothes he was wearing.
It is obvious that he changed into street clothing before
going to his mother's and that he still had the same street
clothing at the tin1e he picked up his work clothing. He
therefore was wearing on the evening of the 16th the
street clothes being worn by him before the unit was
locked. These were clothes of his own choice for street
'\'far.
As to the inconvenience of having to sleep on the
floor, it was originally testified that before moving to
the motel he and his brother lived with his mother at her
residence on Park Street. (Tr. 14). After the respondent
was locked out of the motel he again lived with his mother
and brother at her home on Park Street. Although he
testified that they only had two small rooms, it would
appear that for a mother and two boys the embarrassment suffered by the inconvenience of having to stay
there one night would not support an award of $250.00,
nor any amount. Especially is this true when the entire
situation was caused by the respondent's failure to pay
the rent, which he knew was due and owing.
In Robinson v. Bonhaye (La. 1940), 195 So. 365, a
widow sued for wrongful eviction caused h~, the landlord
taking out the doors and two window sashes during the
<'old weather. The tenant remained on for two weeks
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and had a chifferobe placed in front of the door opening,
which she stated was worth $45.00 and was damaged by
reason of the use to which it was put. She further testified that two window shades were damaged, amounting
to $2.50, and that $2.00 was spent for medicines necessary
by reason of her having caught cold due to the exposure.
The court of appeals allowed a judgment of $50.00, including the humiliation suffered.
Bradford v. Mangano (La. 1942), 6 So. 2d 162, was an
action for wrongful eviction wherein the landlord removed the roof which was said to have caused humiliation and inconvenience to the tenants. The trial court
awarded $6.00 as actual damage and $10 as other damage,
making a total judgment of $16. On appeal this amount
was raised to the sum of $25.
In Holmes v. DiLeo (La. 1938), 184 So. 356, the door
was padlocked by the landlord and, although the landlord denied locking the same, this issue was found against
him. Plaintiff claimed that he was out of possession
25 days and often had to sleep in a chair. The trial court
awarded $250 and the court of appeals reduced this
amount to $75.
In Rammell v. Bulan (Ohio 1948), 80 N.E. 2d 167,
the tenant was locked out for one evening and the trial
court allowed daruages in the sum of $1,000. On appeal
the case was sent back for new trial, the court stating as
follows:
''In our opinion, the damages were only nomi-
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nal, for the plaintiff was unlawfully deprived of
the premises for only one night, which she spent
with a friend without expense to herself.''
If this judgn1ent is allowed to stand, it amounts to
an invitation to young working boys and college students,
such as the ones in this case, to rent a motel unit by the
week and fail to pay their rent, and if any action is taken
against then1 other than the remedy of unlawful detainer, they rna~· recover substantial damages for the
slight inconvenience of having to move back with one of
their parents. To deny the motel keeper the remedy
of peacefully retaking possession and the right to hold
personal property as a lien for unpaid rent and then to
hold him responsible in a substantial amount for the
slightest type of inconvenience, does not appear to be
legal, right, or just under the circumstances of this case.

CONCLUSION
Under the circumstances of this case it cannot be
held as a matter of law that the respondent and his
friends had secured an estate and exclusive possession of
the motel unit occupied by them. The contract was entitled, "Guest Registration"; the services performed,
such as repairing and maintenance, house cleaning serviees, and garbage disposal; the iten1s furnished, such as
furniture, linens, supplies, water, heat, electricity, and
tf·lephone; and retention and use of pass keys are all fattors which are inconsistent with any relation of landlord
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and tenant and can only be justified on the basis of an
innkeeper and guest relationship. Looking objectively at
the position of the appellants, it is obvious that they
should not be relegated to the remedies of a landlord,
leaving them as a practical matter without an immediate
and effective remedy.
At the close of the respondent's case in chief, the
evidence of damages was not sufficient to permit judicial
determination by the court. This fact is conclusivelr
shown since it was necessary for the judge, in computing
damages, to reopen the case on this issue after both parties had rested. The damage as awarded was for mental
anguish and humiliation, which cannot he supported in
the absence of actual damages or malicious conduct
on the part of appellants, and where the wrong, if any,
was to a property right.
The allowance. of $250 for the alleged inconvenience
to a young man such as the respondent for having to sleep
on the floor of his mother's home for one night is extremely excessive. Any actual inconveniencp on the part
of the respondent would not have arisen if he had lived
up to his contract and paid his hills when due and owing.
For himself to he at fault and then seek to hold the appellants for his alleged embarrassment cannot under the
facts of this case, be supported.
The judgment in favor of the respondent should be
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reversed and judgment entered in favor of the appellants
with costs in both courts.
Respectfully submitted,

RICHARDS AND BIRD
DAN S. BUSHNELL
Attorneys for Appellants
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